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(US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), 
was the lethality and virulence of 
terrorists’ intents and goals. Attacks 
in the US, Spain, Great Britain, and 
others urged Romania (as much as 
other countries) transform its overall 
security system to be able to ﬁ  ght 
terrorism and terrorist networks, as 
well as other asymmetric security 
threats and challenges, effectively 
and collaboratively. This paper 
reviews Romania’s security system 
post-Cold War transformation, 
in pursuit of effectively averting, 
countering and combating terrorism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fighting terrorism effectively 
is not a new security responsibility 
for the security forces in Romania. 
Terrorism has been a menace to 
Romania’s national security before 
1989 [1], and for years during the 
Communist regime, Securitate’s 
anti-terrorist elite force’s acumen 
[2] had averted terrorist attacks. Yet, 
Cold War terrorism is different from 
Twenty-First Century terrorism. 
What changed after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, and chieﬂ  y after the atrocious 
terrorist attacks in the United States 2. ROMANIA’S SECURITY 
INSTITUTIONS
Romania’s security forces include 
the armed forces (army, navy, air 
force) under the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), police forces (gendarmerie, 
border, etc.) under the Ministry of 
Administration and Internal Affairs, 
and six [3] intelligence agencies. 
3. TERRORIST THREAT 
TO ROMANIA'S SECURITY
Terrorism does not pose a major 
threat to Romania’s security. Yet, 
Romania could become a terrorist 
target for a variety of reasons. First is 
Romania’s membership (and Eastern 
Border) in Western collective security 
institutions such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the European Union (EU), whose 
countries have often become terrorist 
targets [4]. 
Second is Romania’s unstable 
geographical surroundings 
(neighboring the Black Sea and the 
Balkans yet not far from the Caucasus 
and Near East) [5]. 
Third is the relatively high 
Muslim/Arabic representation in 
Romania, which may transform it 
into a hub for terrorist trafﬁ  c targeting 
both Romania and other countries. 
[6] 
Fourth, even without a “direct” 
Muslim threat, [7] Romania’s 
friendly relations with the US, the 
implementation of the relocation of 
US military bases in Romania since 
2007, and its contribution to the 
international anti-terrorist efforts 
and peace operations could, as well, 
make Romania a target.
4. REFORM AND 
TRANSFORMATION TO 
FIGHT TERRORISM
Fighting terrorism effectively 
calls for a modern, agile, resilient, and 
multi-tasking security system. To this 
end, especially after 9/11, Romania 
has channeled its countering and 
combating terrorism efforts toward 
improved terrorism prevention, 
counter-terrorism intervention, 
and consequence management 
capabilities. These endeavors have 
enveloped, inter alia, the following: 
- a more robust anti-terrorism 
(AT) and counter-terrorism (CT) 
legal framework; 
- effective and timely intelligence 
(organization, structures, personnel 
[including education and training], 
quality of analysis, and equipment);
- more agile security forces, 
increased information sharing, 
coordination and cooperation;
- improved capabilities of tracking 
down and weeding out any human, 
ﬁ   nancial, logistic and operational 
involvement and/or support for 
terrorist activities;
- strengthened intervention 
capabilities (capturing terrorists, 
freeing hostages, reinstating order); 
- better guard and protection 
capabilities and activities; civil 
emergencies, public affairs, and 
outreach activities.
4.1. STRENGTHENED 
ANTI-TERRORISM
 LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As mentioned earlier, terrorism 
has long been a security concern 
for Romania. As a result, its AT/
CT legal framework started to 
develop in the early 1960s, and, as expected, has undergone some 
changes after 9/11, as demanded 
by the new security environment, 
Romania’s determination to join 
the international arena in averting, 
countering, and combating terrorism, 
as well as by the requirements of 
NATO/EU membership. Post 9/11 
legislation stipulates, besides other 
provisions, increased anti-terrorism 
powers and responsibilities for the 
security sector, and heightened 
cooperation. 
A few of the most relevant AT/
CT laws include: all thirteen United 
Nations (UN) conventions on 
combating terrorism; UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1540 (on arm 
proliferation and ballistic missiles), 
1566 (against international terrorism) 
and 1373 (which set up the Anti-
Terrorism Committee); Government 
Emergency Ordinance 141/2001; 
Government Emergency Ordinance 
159/2001; Law 51/1991 on National 
Security; Romanian Penal Code; 
Law 14/1992 (which assigned SRI 
the main roles and mission with 
regard to terrorism prevention and 
countering); Law on the approval of 
the Government Emergency 1/1999 
on the state of siege and state of 
emergency; Law 535/2004 on 
preventing and combating terrorism; 
Law 42/2004 on the armed forces’ 
participation in missions outside 
Romanian territory; Methodology 
of the organization and execution 
of counter-terrorism intervention 
of 2006; Strategy of information 
communication on the prevention 
and limitation of a terrorist risk and 
terrorist crisis situation, of 2007; 
other strategies, doctrines, and 
rules. 
4.2. ROMANIA’S 
NATIONAL SYSTEM 
ON PREVENTING AND 
COMBATING TERRORISM
Given the multifarious, easily 
adjustable, network-style nature of 
the terrorist groups, it became clear 
to the Romanian security decision 
makers that effectively ﬁ  ghting 
terrorism deﬁ   nitely not be the 
job of one agency, but rather, the 
outcome of a concerted action of a 
variety of security institutions. In 
this context, in 2001, the National 
Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), 
as the strategic coordinator of anti-
terrorism strategies and policies, 
designated the SRI the nation’s main 
authority (technical coordinator) in 
AT/CT activities. The SRI is hence 
authorized to conduct independently 
or, if needed, in cooperation and 
coordination with other security 
forces, anti-, counter- and combating 
terrorism operations.[8] During the 
same year, the SRI had established 
a Department for Preventing and 
Combating Terrorism (DPCT), 
featuring a Center of Counter-Terrorist 
Operational Coordination (CCOA) 
as a permanent technical coordinator 
of the interacting agencies within the 
National System on Preventing and 
Combating Terrorism (SNPCT) – 
an integrated structure focusing on 
prevention and countering terrorist 
threats, which was, at that time, 
pending becoming operational.[9] 
The CCOA is charged with collection, 
analysis, and ﬁ  eld  intervention. 
[10] In 2002 a National Strategy on 
Preventing and Combating Terrorism 
was adopted, which regulates the 
roles of all security institutions, 
together with a General Protocol 
on the organization and functioning Romanian Intelligence Service 
(SRI). As previously stated, AT/
CT transformation after 9/11 has 
started with SRI’s becoming the 
anti-terrorism leader in the country. 
Its Department for Preventing and 
Combating Terrorism (DPCT) is the 
coordinator of Romania’s domestic 
AT/CT efforts, charged with the 
integrated planning, organization, 
implementation and execution of all 
activities involving the prevention, 
detection, and annihilation of terrorist 
activities and actions in the country.
[15] Its intelligence component is 
charged with collection and analysis 
on all national security risks, 
challenges and threats, including 
terrorism. [16] DGPCT’s operational 
of the SNPCT.[11] The SNPCT 
became fully [12] operational in 
2005 after the CSAT’s adoption of a 
Regulation on the Organization and 
Functioning of the CCOA. [13] The 
SNPCT is tasked with preventing and 
combating terrorism via consultative, 
cooperative and collaborative efforts 
with additional security agencies in 
Romania and foreign counterparts 
abroad.[14] 
Each SNPCT component has as 
well undergone transformation in 
view of better tackling the vagaries 
of the world’s current security 
landscape. This paper will further 
dwell upon the transformation of the 
security forces’ speciﬁ  c anti-terrorism 
roles, missions, and capabilities. elite intervention unit, trained in the 
U.S. at Delta bases, and in Great 
Britain at SAS facilities, which 
specializes in possible interventions 
outside Romanian territory, including 
freeing hostages and ensuring the 
guard and protection of embassies 
abroad. [19] After 9/11, the SIE also 
underwent a transformation and 
reorganization process, following the 
model of the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).
Guard and Protection Service 
(SPP): The SPP is Romania’s agency 
charged with the guarding and 
protection of the life and personal 
integrity of the President, as well as 
other Romanian and foreign diplomats 
and leaders. It has collection, analysis, 
component, the AT Brigade (BA), 
created on the ruins of Securitate’s 
former Special Unit for Fighting 
Terrorism (USLA), ensures the AT 
protection of Romanian and foreign 
dignitaries, and conducts AT/CT 
operations in venues under attack or 
seized by terrorists, being capable 
to deploy and execute ground, air, 
and maritime missions everywhere 
in Romania within two-and-a-half 
hours.[17]
Foreign Intelligence Service 
(SIE): The SIE ensures the collection, 
assessment, and dissemination 
of relevant threat development 
(including terrorism) outside 
Romania’s territory, as well as ﬁ  eld 
intervention. [18] It established an sources, and uses HUMINT, IMINT, 
MASINT, and SIGINT.[23] These 
capabilities have also been used for 
preventing and combating maritime 
terrorism at the Black Sea. [24] 
The DGIA has recently developed 
a functional cyberintelligence 
(CYBERINT) structure, charged 
with the surveillance and collection 
from cyberspace, aimed to prevent 
and stop any malicious, hostile and 
deceptive cyberthreats or cyberattacks 
to Romania’s security.[25] Its overall 
“INT” capabilities, coupled with 
the recently adopted system of 
communications monitoring through 
satellite (MONSAT) [26] make 
the DGIA an effective intelligence 
with regard to asymmetrical threats, 
including terrorism. 
Second, various MOD components 
have developed modern, NATO 
interoperable AT/CT intervention 
capabilities and task forces. The DGIA 
has a Rapid Intervention Detachment 
(DIR), charged with: guarding 
and protection of MOD facilities, 
assets, leaders, and personnel, both 
in Romania and abroad (including 
those in the theaters of operations); 
technical AT control and CT actions 
and intervention (in cooperation 
with its SNPCT counterparts); and 
guarding and protection of all foreign 
military facilities and personnel 
operating on the Romanian territory. 
[27] Under DGIA also functions, 
since 2011, the Special Operation 
Force (SOF) Battalion, “Vulturii” for 
out-of-area operations under NATO 
or Multinational Forces command. 
[28] The SOF have a land component 
(e.g. the 1st SF Battalion and disparate 
assets [reconnaissance, paratroopers, 
infantry, mountain troops, NBC, 
engineers, communications, 
psychological operations, and 
and ﬁ  eld intervention responsibilities 
and capabilities. Its Anti-Terrorist 
Intervention Section (SIAT) is charged 
with the prevention and countering 
of terrorist risks, challenges, and 
attacks aimed at the persons/facilities 
the SPP is safeguarding. [20]
Ministry of Defense: Romania’s 
Armed Forces are integral part of 
the SNTP; since the end of the Cold 
War and especially after the terrorist 
attacks in the US and Europe, its anti-
terrorist units have embarked upon an 
systematic transformation, to adjust 
to the new security threats effectively, 
and become more interoperable with 
NATO/EU similar structures. The 
Armed Forces’ AT/CT contribution 
involves intelligence, operational, 
and combat actions (and adjacent 
support). 
First, MOD’s General Directorate 
for Defense Intelligence (DGIA) 
ensures the military intelligence: the 
collection, processing, assessment, 
analysis, storing and utilization 
of information and data on all 
security risks, challenges, and 
threats (military and non-military, 
domestic and international), which 
impact Romania’s security from 
the perspective of national defense; 
counterintelligence activities; the 
protection of national, NATO and 
EU classiﬁ   ed information within 
the MOD; and combat and ﬁ  eld 
interventions and operations.
[21] It contributes with Liaison 
Ofﬁ   cers (HUMINT) and analysis 
to the various UN, NATO or EU 
operations. [22] The DGIA makes 
Romania one of the few NATO 
members to have an Integrated 
Multisource Collection Capability 
(IMCC), which receives information 
from theaters of operation as well 
as from operational and strategic Ministry of Administration and 
Internal Affairs: The MIRA has 
developed intelligence capabilities 
and AT/CT intervention teams. The 
General Directorate for Intelligence 
and Internal Security (DGIPI) is 
MIRA’s intelligence unit which 
does collection and analysis on 
terrorist threats and organized crime.
[36] Gendarmerie has a Special 
Intervention Brigade, “Vlad Tepes”, 
charged with countering serious and 
violent street crimes and terrorist 
activities (hostage rescuing, counter-
terrorist operations, sensitive 
objectives protection, etc.).[37] 
The Brigade was named after the 
notorious king Vlad Tepes, whose 
reign was crime-free, due to the 
strong hand of his rule. “Vlad Tepes” 
features, among others, the Special 
Protection and Intervention Group 
“Acvila”, which handles protection 
of dignitaries protection (especially 
those who received death threats), 
special police intervention (against 
individual or organized criminals), and 
AT/CT intervention (in cooperation 
with other CT structures). [38] The 
Border Police has the Security Rapid 
Intervention Force (SASI) that ﬁ  ghts 
organized crime and terrorism at the 
border area. [39]
Special Telecommunications 
Service (STS): The STS organizes 
and coordinates the lawful 
telecommunications activities 
for Romania’s public authorities 
and other users. The institution 
performs SIGINT functions. With 
regard to combating terrorism, 
STS implemented the European 
emergency call number 1-1-2 in 
Romania. [40]
logistical support]), a supporting air 
component (e.g. ﬁ  ghters,  bombers, 
transportation aircraft etc.), as well 
as a supporting naval component 
(e.g. SEAL-type elements, and 
transportation boats).[29] Its 
combating terrorism operations 
encompass hostage rescue, recovery 
or capture of sensitive material, and 
the targeting of terrorist organization 
infrastructure.[30] The Navy 
has two NATO certiﬁ  ed  SEALS 
Detachments, whose main AT/CT 
duties involve defending anchoring 
places and deep water routes, mine 
detection and demining, defending 
oil drilling platforms, and preventing 
underwater diversions.[31] The 
DNFOS conduct sea, air and land 
missions, any time and in any place, 
and comprise combat incursion 
divers and command ofﬁ  cers,  and 
is part of the Special Operations 
Force Naval Group (GNFOS). [32] 
They are multi-tasking, in that, 
besides divers, they are paratroopers, 
mountain troops, scouts, and snipers. 
[33] The Marines have the Infantry 
Battalion, an intervention unit that 
conducts commando operations, 
reconnaissance actions, and other. 
[34] 
Third, additional AT/CT efforts 
reside in the following: Air Force 
support to CT intervention (e.g. 
personnel transportation to the 
immediate proximity of the risk 
region, combat support, evacuation, 
etc.); Navy contribution with data 
and information, transportation to the 
target, and in certain circumstances, 
combat support; and, Army 
contribution with infantry battalions 
(e.g. paratroopers, mountaineers), 
military police, NBC, engineers, 
EOD, as well as logistic and medical 
support. [35] (NGOs, media, think tanks, and 
academia representatives), and even 
directly with the population (schools, 
high schools, and even kindergartens), 
aiming, on the one hand, at informing 
the population on the threats and 
challenges posed by terrorism to 
Romania’s security, explaining their 
capabilities to protect the citizens, 
and, on the other hand, encouraging 
the citizens to alert the security 
agencies on potential terrorist threats. 
Round tables, seminars, meetings, 
visits to education facilities are but a 
few efforts in this context, undertaken 
by the intelligence agencies (and 
even their anti-terrorist intervention 
units). [46] These endeavors seem to 
have served their purposes; not only 
have the citizens become more aware 
of the terrorist threats to Romania’s 
national, regional and international 
security, but they have also become 
more willing to notify the security 
institutions on threats. As former 
SIE director Ioan Talpes noted, much 
of the information that contributed 
to averting and combating terrorist 
threats in Romania came from the 
populace. [47]
4.3.2. INTERNATIONAL 
OUTREACH 
AND COOPERATION
Romania has also been an active 
supporter of the global efforts aimed 
to deny terrorists and terrorist groups 
the oxygen of evil doing. To this end, 
immediately after 9/11, Romania 
fully supported NATO’s decision 
on the implementation of Article 5 
of the Washington Treaty, allowed 
U.S. aircraft to utilize its airspace 
for combat actions in Afghanistan, 
contributed military troops, police and 
intelligence personnel for NATO’s 
missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
 4.3. COMBATING TERRORISM 
IS “EVERYONE’S BUSINESS”
4.3.1. DOMESTIC EFFORTS
The CSAT is the main coordinator 
of Romania’s security activity. In line 
with CSAT’s directives, policies, and 
protocols, and in compliance with 
a series of interagency cooperation 
and coordination rules, laws and 
regulations, all components of the 
SNPCT have established coordination 
and cooperation agreements among 
themselves, with other security 
institutions, and with international 
counterparts. In addition, they 
have also established avenues of 
communication, information and 
collaboration with representatives 
of civil society. All these have 
paved the way toward information 
and intelligence sharing, common 
education and training, mutual 
support (with regard to personnel, 
education and training), and joint 
ﬁ  eld and combat operations. 
The CSAT issued a cooperation 
protocol among all security 
institutions to enable information 
and intelligence sharing. [41] The 
intelligence agencies have additional 
speciﬁ   c protocols on sharing, 
protection of classiﬁ  ed information, 
SIGINT, and monitoring satellite 
communications. [42] Anti-terrorist 
brigades and intervention units of 
the anti-terrorist system are training 
together, [43] exchange personnel 
[44], and act together [45] under the 
SRI’s coordination.
Since “security is everyone’s 
business”, the security organizations 
(including intelligence) have also 
established communications and 
information avenues with the civilian 
decision makers (executive and 
legislative members), civil society collective security organizations, 
have participated in numerous 
common training programs and 
exercises with U.S., French, and U.K. 
counterparts. DIR has been actively 
participating in all NATO and 
non-NATO anti-terrorist exercises 
organized by the Romanian Armed 
Forces, joint exercises with the 1st 
Battalion/10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne), U.S. Special Operations 
Command Europe, or with Bulgarian 
and Serbian counterparts (on border 
and counter-terrorism issues).[52] 
With regard to the armed forces 
AT/CT cooperation, besides the 
Romania’s military participation in
NATO exercises, relevant, too, are
the naval operations “NATO Active
Endeavour” and “Black Sea Harmony”, 
which brought together various 
South Eastern European countries, 
and the effective counter-terrorism 
simulations within the South Eastern 
Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM).
[53] 
On the same note, within the 
framework of EUROPOL, besides 
cooperation with EU members, 
Romania’s law enforcement agencies 
cooperate and share information with 
counterparts from various countries 
and organizations, including 
countries from SEE countries that 
are not members of the EU (e.g. 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, and Turkey).[54] 
Likewise, within the SECI Center’s 
Anti-Terrorism Task Force Romania’s 
law enforcement agencies have been 
cooperating with SEE counterparts, 
through regular meetings, as well 
as information and experience 
exchange and sharing.[55] It is 
also worth mentioning Romania’s 
MIRA AT/CT brigades joint training 
joined the Coalition of the willing 
in Iraq, and dynamically engaged 
in the myriad global, regional and 
subregional collaborative AT/CT 
enterprises. [48] 
Within the UN, NATO, EU, 
the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), etc., as 
well as within various international 
networks of countering terrorist 
ﬁ   nancing (e.g. Egmont Group), 
Romania’s security agencies have 
been active participants and positive 
forces in supporting security and 
security cooperation.[49] In South 
Eastern Europe (SEE), Romania 
has been participating in a variety 
of either bilateral or subregional 
collective security initiatives and 
institutions, including the Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI) Center for Combating Trans 
Border Crime, European Network 
and Information Security Agency 
(ENSIA), European Police Ofﬁ  ce 
(EUROPOL), International Bomb 
Data Center, Balkan Communication 
Network, numerous Black Sea 
cooperative initiatives, the Brdo 
Process, the Regional Arms Control 
Veriﬁ   cation and Implementation 
Assistance Center (RACVIAC), and 
others.[50] 
As intelligence agencies are ﬁ  rst 
in line of AT/CT defense, and from 
the premise of 'ﬁ  ghting networks with 
networks', Romania’s intelligence 
agencies have established speciﬁ  c 
intelligence sharing and exchange 
mechanisms with foreign partners, on 
information sharing, mutual support 
(including  ﬁ  nancial,  acquisitions 
and procurement), visits, and joint 
training.[51] SIE, SRI and SPP 
intervention teams, either based on 
bilateral agreements, or under the 
umbrella of the previously-mentioned also obstructed the modernization 
of some security agencies, including 
AT/CT transformation.[57] 
Third, resources and resource 
allocation are essential in achieving 
effectiveness. [58] Some special 
intervention units are still in need 
of up-to-date equipment and assets. 
For example, parts of the deep sea 
diving techniques within the Military 
Divers Center where DNFOS and 
EOD detachments are trained is thirty 
years old and needed to be replaced 
a while ago; due to limited resources, 
upgrading of the technique has been 
incremental.[59] 
Fourth, and most important, even 
with a rather solid legal framework 
for cooperation, developing security 
cooperation (including in the ﬁ  eld 
of anti-terrorism) in Romania has 
been cumbersome, due to agencies’ 
rigidiﬁ   ed bureaucratic environment 
(which has delayed and/or 
hindered information sharing and 
collaboration), too many intelligence 
agencies (which fueled dishonest 
competition and rivalry among 
agencies, because of redundancy 
and overlapping roles and missions), 
politicization, and political inﬁ  ghting.
[60] Security and intelligence 
cooperation/collaboration is still an 
issue, in that some agencies still prefer 
bilateral approaches, while others are 
still reluctant to share information, 
especially in a multilateral format, 
unless a crisis comes up.[61] 
Fifth, Cooperation at the 
international level was also difﬁ  cult 
at ﬁ  rst; Romania remained isolated 
from the West, as many NATO and 
Western counterparts were reluctant 
to share information with Romanian 
intelligence personnel who had 
previously worked for the Securitate 
and remained employed by the 
and exchange of expertise with 
international counterparts, especially 
from Germany.
4.4. ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA’S
ANTI-TERRORISM 
EFFECTIVENESS: 
CHALLENGES AND 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Romania has implemented 
dramatic changes in its security 
system since the end of Communism 
and accession to NATO and the EU 
to better ﬁ  ght current security threats, 
including terrorism. Yet, these 
changes did not happen overnight; 
they involved a lot of work, efforts, 
and willingness, and had to face a 
series of challenges. 
First is the challenge of time: it 
takes time to build professionalism 
and expertise. With regard to 
intelligence, for example, the purge 
of former Securitate personnel 
(mainly those involved in abuses 
and transgressions during the 
communist regime) from the post-
communist agencies left a vacuum 
of expertise in the new structures. 
Recruiting, educating and training 
new collection agents, analysts and 
even intervention personnel has been 
an onerous process.[56] In the same 
context, since expertise requires 
time to build, some of the AT/CT 
units have become operational and 
interoperable after a few years since 
establishment, while others are yet to 
be fully operational. 
Second, parts of the legal 
framework on security are obsolete, 
enacted when Romania was not a 
member of any regional collective 
security organization, and was 
surrounded by a different geopolitical 
context, in which the terrorist threat 
was not as high as now; these have their AT/CT collectors and analysts, 
revamped and strengthened the 
interoperability of their intervention 
and combat units (especially as a 
result of NATO/EU membership), 
and deployed professional teams in 
the theaters, capable to effectively 
predict, avert, and counter concrete 
security risk factors and crises.[65] 
At the domestic level stand 
out the numerous AT/CT cases of 
effectiveness [66], a direct outcome 
of the robust security transformation, 
on the one hand, and of improved 
collaborative [67] actions of the 
intelligence agencies, police, 
and other security organizations, 
seconded by Romania’s willingness 
to contribute to the international 
conjugated efforts to stave off 
terrorism.[68] At the international 
level (especially in Iraq and 
Afghanistan), stand out Romania’s 
effective HUMINT, IMINT and 
GEOINT capabilities within hostile 
operational environments.[69] 
Romania’s professionalism and 
expertise has led to the establishment 
in Romania (as a NATO decision) 
of a NATO HUMINT Center of 
Excellence (COE), which ensures 
HUMINT training, participates in 
NATO documents development, 
and other issues related to NATO 
standardization process.[70] In 
addition, SPP ofﬁ   cers have proved 
professionalism when conduction 
guard and protection missions of 
various UN ofﬁ  cials in Sudan, Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which may lead to 
the creation of a center of excellence 
(both training and research and 
development) in Romania, in support 
of UN activities.[71] 
On the other hand, to overcome 
challenges to the democratization of 
the security forces (e.g. intelligence), 
agencies after the regime change in 
December 1989.[62] In addition, AT/
CT cooperation among the countries 
of South Eastern Europe (including 
Romania) has been hampered by a 
series of discrepancies in terms of 
country development, institution-
building, and European and Euro-
Atlantic integration; hence different 
paces of security sector reform (SSR) 
and transformation, different counter-
terrorism and organized crime 
legislation, resources, capabilities, 
methods, and equipment.[63] 
Sixth, and related to the previous 
point, problematic too, could be the 
existence of too many intervention 
units, which may, at a minimum, 
become a bureaucratic burden, due to 
potential overlapping and duplication 
of responsibilities and missions. 
Seventh, the security institutions, 
in particular intelligence agencies, 
have been the subjects of various 
media scandals due to negligence 
(e.g. avoiding to monitor a Romanian 
businessman of Syrian origin, 
charged with terrorism, who later 
disappeared), malfeasance (using 
terrorism prevention to wiretap 
innocent people), leak of classiﬁ  ed 
information (e.g. information 
involving AT/CT issues), and 
politicization; these practices have 
affected the overall security reform 
process, which also impacted the AT/
CT transformation.[64] 
In time, Romania’s security 
agencies have been able to overcome 
these challenges and, through 
elaborated transformation endeavors 
in terms of personnel, structure, 
organization, resources, and 
acquisitions, become more effective 
and more network-like, both internally 
and abroad. Romania’s counter 
terrorism forces have transformed collection, analysis, dissemination of 
relevant and timely information to the 
national and international decision 
makers; assets and capabilities of 
effective AT/CT intervention; team 
players and professionals in the CT 
coalitions within various theaters of 
operations. Their professionalism 
and effectiveness in the joint ﬁ  ght 
of terrorism has been repeatedly 
recognized by foreign counterparts. 
[74] Based on the principle of 
indivisible and cooperative security, 
Romania’s security forces (with 
intelligence in the ﬁ   rst line) will 
continue their involvement in the 
international and regional efforts to 
stop terrorism.
In South Eastern Europe, 
Romania is well linked with other 
SEE countries (which share similar 
security concerns and challenges) in 
the  ﬁ  ght against terrorism, through 
several cooperative mechanisms, 
ranging from bilateral agreements and 
subregional arrangements, to regional 
organizations and alliances. The 
Romanian security forces’ profuse 
connection with SEE countries 
involves, on the other hand, habitual 
meetings, experience and information 
sharing avenues, common education, 
training, and exercises on anti- 
counter- and combating terrorism 
issues, and, on the other hand, joint 
AT/CT interventions and missions. 
Effective AT/CT responses in SEE are 
due, besides others, to the Romanian 
security forces’ contribution, too.
Admittedly, challenges have 
tested and will keep testing 
South Eastern Europe’s security 
cooperation. Yet, despite any present 
or future challenges, SEE’s ﬁ  ght 
against terrorism will continue to 
beneﬁ   t from Romania’s important 
geostrategic position, good relations 
and prevent the use of “terrorism 
prevention” as a pretext for abuses, 
the Romanian authorities, whether 
pressured by the civil society and 
international partners, or following 
their own will to change, have 
institutionalized processes to support 
both the effectiveness of the security 
agencies, as well transparency and 
democratic control. [72] 
5. CONCLUSIONS
Terrorism is omnipresent and no 
country (Romania included) is exempt 
from its threats and challenges; as 
former SRI Director Radu Timofte 
once stated, “Al-Qaeda does not 
wear a 'visitor' badge when present in 
one country or another”. [73] Events 
like 9/11 were not isolated, one-
time, singular actions, but part of a 
progressive chain of vitriolic terrorist 
attacks (Madrid, London, Istanbul, 
Sharm el Sheikh, Mumbai, Bombay, 
and others). Romania has been a 
vehement opponent of terrorism 
and terrorist attacks, as well as an 
active participant in the international 
endeavors to curb it. 
Since the regime change in 
1989, and especially after the 
terrorist attacks in the United States 
in 2001, Romania has embarked 
upon a comprehensive reform and 
transformation process aimed on the 
one hand at the democratization of 
its security forces, and, on the other 
hand, at their effectiveness in ﬁ  ghting 
the post-Cold War security threats 
and challenges, including terrorism. 
In time and after having totally or 
partially overcome a number of 
challenges, Romania’s security forces 
are now full and effective contributors 
to the international ﬁ  ght  against 
terrorism, at national and international 
levels, as follows: capabilities of ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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with its neighbors and other 
regional partners, and reliable AT/
CT capabilities. Romania’s security 
forces will strengthen their AT/
CT contribution to NATO, EU 
(EUROPOL), and the SECI Center, 
will maintain and improve bilateral 
and trilateral cooperation and 
information sharing with those SEE 
countries that are not (yet) NATO/
EU members (while supporting and 
assisting the membership efforts of 
SEE NATO/EU aspirant countries), 
and will deepen cooperation at the 
Black Sea.
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